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Abstract 
 
In this research, the effect of central bank intervention within a 
heterogeneous expectation exchange rate model is investigated. The results are 
supporting both chartists and fundamentalist regimes. In the period investigated, 
chartist dominates in determining the exchange rate. While BI foreign exchange 
intervention can effectively push the market exchange-rate to its long-run 
fundamental equilibrium, however, Bank Indonesia’s effort to exert a stabilizing 
effect of foreign exchange interventions, the result does not show a success. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
According with the postulate impossible trinity, freely floating exchange rate will be 
adapted by a country which adapts freely foreign exchange system and independent monetary 
policy. Indonesia is one of country that adapts it. By freely floating exchange rate and 
position as a small open economy, Indonesia's exchange rate movement is strongly 
influenced by capital flows moreover in the short run. In foreign exchange market, capital 
flows is a reaction of foreign-exchange players to buy or sell foreign exchange. Foreign-
exchange player can be categorized in two groups. First group called fundamentalists, buy or 
sell foreign exchange based on their expectation of future exchange rate with regard to 
fundamental economic condition. The other group called chartist, buy or sell foreign 
exchange based on their expectation on future exchange rate with regard to previous 
exchange-rate behavior. These two groups determine market exchange-rate as reflected by 
interaction of supply and demand of foreign exchange. Sometimes, the exchange rate moves 
beyond their fundamental value. Hence, existence of central bank’s.foreign-exchange 
intervention policy is needed to drive the exchange rate back to its long-run fundamental 
value. The main results in the empirical literature (Almekinders and Sylvester, 1996; Frenkel, 
2004; Ito and Yabu, 2007; and in papers of surveys Neely and Weller, 2001) suggest that 
foreign-exchange intervention policy tend to be conducted in order to reduce exchange rate 
misalignment or to reduce foreign exchange undesired fluctuations 
Foreign-exchange interventions by the central bank could be categorized in two parts. 
Firstly, a foreign-exchange intervention (non-sterilized) occurs when a monetary authority 
buys (sells) foreign exchange which affect the monetary base, interest rates, market 
expectations and intimately the exchange rate. Secondly, foreign-exchange intervention is 
said sterilized if the monetary authority offsets or sterilizes the effect of the foreign exchange 
operation on the monetary base by selling or buying domestic bonds in order to keep the 
monetary policy unchanged. 
With the central bank policy, the exchange rates would hopefully stay in the desired 
level and its stability can be ensured. Nevertheless, beside relying on central bank policy to 
stabilize the exchange rate, financial agents are sometimes actively hedging the exchange rate 
in order to avoid losses due to exchange rate fluctuations. Röthig, Semmler, and Flaschel 
(2005) argued that the negative effect of exchange rate on the balance sheet can be eliminated 
by risk management like hedging. Hedging generally conducts by forward transactions, 
swaps, NDF etc. 
In this part of paper, the behavior of microstructure of foreign exchange market 
players (fundamentalists and chartists) in determining exchange rate is investigated. This 
approach is hopefully able to overcome the failure of numerous empirical studies based on 
the asset market approach of exchange rate to explain short term movements of exchange rate 
(Lewis, 1995 and Taylor, 1995. This paper adopts the exchange-rate microstructure approach 
called ‘noise trading’ channel pioneered by Hung (1997) and the coordination channel Reitz 
and Taylor (2008), and Taylor (2004), (2005). Ahrens and Reitz (2003) perform empirical 
study regarding to this issue and their result provide evidence that the heterogeneous 
expectations exchange rate model is able to explain daily German-US forward rates. Further 
research by Maatoug, Fatnassi, Omri (2010) finds that both regimes (fundamentalists and 
chartists) are persistent in Australia. However he finds that the fundamentalists regime is 
riskier and when the RBA was not active in the foreign exchange, the fundamentalists were 
disappeared. Other study using marcov switching approach by Brunetti, Mariano, Scotti 
(2007) in Southeast Asia, finds that real effective exchange rates, money supply, stock index 
returns, are important variables to identify turbulence and ordinary periods.   
To investigate different forecasting strategies by the players, the impact of central 
bank intervention is investigated applying a heterogeneous expectations exchange rate model. 
The approach is also evaluated by including central bank intervention policy to drive 
exchange rate to its long-run fundamental value. Foreign-exchange interventions would allow 
foreign-exchange intervention to influence the both forecasting rules of chartists and 
fundamentalists, thereby altering the proportion of the two groups in the foreign exchange 
market. A central bank intervening in the foreign exchange market is considered effective if 
the exchange rate is driving closer to its fundamental value. Generally, foreign-exchange 
intervention may as well improve the performance of expectations based on fundamentals, 
especially when central banks try to correct current exchange rate misalignments. Following 
Frankel and Froot (1986) the excess demand/supply for foreign currency is assumed to be a 
function of the relative success of chartist and fundamentalist forecasting techniques. At the 
end, it is suggested that the performance of chartist or fundamentalist exchange-rate 
expectation is expected to be improved by central bank intervention.  
This research furthermore re-examines the effects of foreign-exchange intervention on 
exchange rate volatility within the heterogeneous groups in the foreign exchange market. 
These studies suggested two new channels through which sterilized intervention may be 
transmitted: the noise trading channel (Hung, 1997) assuming two hypotheses: noise traders 
will determine exchange rate by flow market equilibrium and the central bank should 
intervene in highly volatile market periods and keep its interventions secret (Reitz, 2002).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 describes the theory and 
literature study, followed by Research Methodology in section3. Our main empirical results 
concerning intervention effectiveness are reported in Section 4, before the final section (5) 
concludes. 
 
2. THEORY 
2.1  Foreign Exchange Market Microstructure 
In macro perspective, foreign exchange level should reflect the fundamental economy 
condition. As described so far, the determinants of the exchange rate like inflation, 
productivity, interest rate, etc categorized as fundamental factors which significantly affect 
long-run exchange-rate. Furthermore, news related to the fundamental factors such as statistic 
announcements of money supplies, trade balances, or fiscal policies is received by the 
market, and the exchange rates will also change to reflect this news. However, there is also 
significant issue regarding foreign-exchange microstructure which also determine exchange 
rates. Understanding the “market microstructure” allows us to explain the evolution of the 
foreign exchange rate, in which foreign exchange traders adjust their foreign-exchange 
purchase or sale based on their own rules.  In addition to macroeconomic indicators news, 
there also exists private information from which some traders know more than others about 
the current state of the market.  
As illustrated in Figure 1, exchange rate is determined by two groups according to 
different approaches of expectations; the fundamental analysis and the chartist analysis. The 
classification was proposed previously by Frankel and Froot (1986, 1990), and has been 
enhanced among others by Ahrens and Reitz (2003), Reitz (2002), Westerhoff (2003), 
Wieland and Westerhoff (2005). In this diagram, the market exchange-rate is built by 
combining fundamentalists and chartists exchange-rate expectation adjusted by their own 
proportion in the foreign-exchange market. In the period of misaligned exchange-rate from 
desired value, central bank will enter the market to re-adjust the exchange rate to its desired 
level or mitigate the short-term fluctuations. 
 
 Source: Own elaboration 
Diagram 1. Fundamentalist-Chartist FX Expectation Mechanism 
 
2.2  Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies 
Global financial market has been pushing emerging countries financial market also 
more integrated to the in global financial market. As return of assets offered is often higher 
than ones in advanced financial market, the asset return including exchange rate is moving 
with more fluctuates. This condition is not accepted by most central banks as it will ignite 
more uncertainty in their financial market. There are some reasons behind that such as, first, 
large movements in the real exchange rate away from medium-run equilibrium are costly, and 
second, there is imperfect capital mobility/asset substitutability. To overcome this 
phenomenon, most central banks in emerging market economies implement various monetary 
policies. The most popular ones are sterilized intervention and short-term policy rate. This 
opens up the fortuitous possibility that policymakers may be operating in a two-target, two-
instrument world. In this note, this research re-examines the case for using two policy 
instruments (the policy interest rate and FX market intervention) under an IT regime in 
Indonesia’s financial market. Hence, a central bank indeed implements two instruments (the 
policy interest rate and FX intervention). 
Lesson learned from previous financial crises, push central banks to maintain stable 
consumer prices if they are to achieve sustained and stable growth. Therefore, the central 
banks need more policies than just the policy interest rate such as foreign-exchange 
interventions. Lesson learned from previous financial crises, central banks should maintain 
stable consumer prices as well as promote sustainable growth in order to avoid the financial 
crises. Therefore, the central banks need more policies than just the policy interest rate such 
as foreign-exchange interventions. One more important think is the central bank should also 
maintain financial sector stability including stable exchange-rate and healthy domestic 
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financial institutions in micro perspective. Regarding to exchange rate, the central bank 
should avoid possible large deviations of the exchange rate from its medium-run equilibrium, 
even in an Inflation Target which requires floating exchange-rate system. The undesired 
exchange rate fluctuations might be response shortly by foreign-exchange intervention, if it 
moves persistently.  Response to such changes can deliver better economic outcomes under 
ITF which requires free-floating exchange-rate system (but in some reason, a measured 
foreign-exchange intervention to drive the exchange rate in line with desired inflation, cannot 
be neglected)   than benign neglect of the exchange rate (Stone, Roger, Shimizu, Nordstrom, 
Kisinbay, Restrepo, 2009). Furthermore, in some cases, the exchange-rate moves very 
volatile persistently then it should be minimized with additional monetary policies beyond 
exchange-rate intervention. In this regard, interest rate policy may be powerful to support 
exchange rate stability as well as price stability in order to achieve sustainable economic 
growth. 
 
2.3  The Foreign Exchange Market and Purposes of Foreign Exchange Intervention 
Volatility in foreign exchange rates can disrupt domestic economy through 
deteriorating imports and exports performance, decreasing cross-border investment and 
funding, and threaten the stability of domestic prices through changes in prices for imported 
or exported goods (passed-through power of exchange rate to inflation). As a result, this 
could affect the domestic economy and even the economies of trading partners abroad. 
Therefore, the monetary authority even with ITF should manage the exchange rate to support 
the achievement of domestic price stability and domestic economy by applying monetary 
policies such as foreign exchange intervention. While many central banks objectives are to 
set the optimal level of foreign-exchange that support price stability achievement as well as to 
mitigate exchange-rate volatility, however, others prefer to limit exchange rate volatility 
rather than to meet a specific target for the level of the exchange rate. Beyond on that, most 
central banks admit that domestic interest is still the main reason why they enter the foreign-
exchange market in a sustained basis. For example as summarized in BIS publication (2006), 
major emerging central banks in Asia perform selling intervention to halt the continuing their 
currency appreciation between the end of 2001 and the end of 2004. As a consequence, 
global foreign exchange reserves grew by over US$ 1600 billion, reflecting reserve 
accumulation by emerging market economies. This phenomenon shows the emerging central 
banks was actively enter the foreign exchange market to avoid their undesired appreciation of 
their currencies as it would harm their export competitiveness/domestic economy. 
On the other hand, some central banks have different views on exchange rate. They 
conversely prefer to stay behind from the foreign exchange intervention such as few 
developed countries have actively intervened within the last decade. There are some reasons 
behind that decision. One of them suggests foreign exchange intervention policy is not good 
for the economy where unbalances exist. Letting the exchange rate fluctuate freely is a sign 
of economic rebalancing is working. In this case, the dynamics of the exchange rate is a 
functioned as automatic stabilizer for the economy. This argument is elaborated in the studies 
by Calvo and Reinhart (2000) which concludes the foreign exchange intervention is a kind of 
fear of floating phenomenon. BIS (2006) summarizes reasons why developed countries no 
longer actively intervene foreign-exchange market. BIS suggest that the instrument is only 
effective if regarded as additional policy interest rate. Another reason implied that large-scale 
intervention can undermine the stance of monetary policy independence. The last reason is 
that private financial markets have enough capacity to absorb and manage shocks - so let the 
market determine the exchange rate.  
There are many economists are interested to see the effectiveness of exchange rate 
intervention which conducted by central bank due to stabilize the exchange rate. However, 
there are also the differences about the view of exchange rate intervention affectivity to 
stabilize the exchange rate. Taylor (2004) examines the effectiveness of exchange rate 
intervention by using Markov switching model  applied to dollar-mark data for the period 
1985-98. In his conclusion, Taylor shows that the intervention increase the probability of 
stability when the rate is misaligned, and that its influence grows with the degree of 
misalignment. However, intervention within a small neighborhood of equilibrium will result 
in a greater probability of instability. Beine, Grauwe, and Grimaldi (2009) investigated the 
effect of sterilized intervention in a noise trading channel with two states Markov switching 
model. Using biweekly data, they found that interventions increase the weight of 
fundamentalists in the foreign exchange market and therefore exert stabilizing influence on 
the exchange rate. The fundamentalist behavior tends to stabilize the market while the 
presence of chartists may cause destabilization. Other study by Dominguez (1998) explored 
the effect of foreign exchange intervention by the G-3 central banks (US, German, and 
Japanese) on the behavior of exchange rates over the 1977-1994 period. The results indicate 
that intervention operations generally increase exchange rate volatility.  
 
2.4  Foreign Exchange Market Microstructure and Foreign Exchange Intervention 
Within microstructure approach, exchange-rate behavior is investigated. As discussed 
previously, the microstructure approach of exchange rate studies suggested two new channels 
through which sterilized intervention may be transmitted. In this regards, foreign-exchange 
intervention influence the expectations of foreign-exchange traders which are defined as 
fundamentalist and chartists. In this case, Frankel and Froot (1988) developed a model 
incorporate both players which is used to forecast the exchange rate expectations by them. 
The fundamentalist approach forecasts exchange rate expectation by the fundamentalists 
based upon economic fundamentals, whereas the chartist approach forecasts exchange-rate 
expectation by chartists based upon the past behavior of the exchange rate. Furthermore, this 
model is developed by Vigfusson (1996) by implementing the Markov regime-switching 
model, in which explains the Chartist and Fundamentalists (C&F). He also suggests that 
using MA chartist model appears to do much better the AR chartist model. In this approach 
there are two rules in which two forecasting equations of both chartist and fundamentalist set 
up to estimate foreign exchange expectations. In each equation, C&F model placed the time-
varying weight.  
The further research from Reitz (2002) is about the usage of C&F model to analyze 
the exchange rate behavior by the market players and also investigate the impact of foreign 
exchange intervention by central bank to the exchange rate expectations by the traders. Reitz 
propose a generalization of the noise trader transmission mechanism to examine the impact of 
central bank intervention on exchange rates. Within a heterogeneous expectations exchange 
rate model intervention operations are supposed to provide support to either chartist or 
fundamentalist forecasts, which forces portfolio managers to adjust their foreign currency 
positions. He test the model by applying daily US-dollar/DEM forward rates and intervention 
data of the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve from 1979 to 1992 in the model. 
He finds that the performance of simple chartist trading rules was strong whenever these 
central banks intervened on the foreign exchange market. Instead, the fundamentalists which 
use the fundamentalist technique has a worse estimation results. 
In Australia, the RBA's approach to foreign exchange market intervention has evolved 
since the float of the Australian dollar in 1983, as the Australian foreign exchange market has 
developed and market participants have become better equipped to manage their foreign 
exchange risk. Over time, foreign exchange market intervention has become much less 
frequent and more targeted towards addressing periods of market dysfunction. Obviously 
since 2008, the foreign exchange intervention by the RBA has been suspended. 
 3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1  The Chartist-Fundamentalist (C & F) Model Specification 
In this part of paper, the market exchange rate of USD/IDR is built through the 
interaction of foreign-exchange demand-supply in domestic foreign-exchange market. The 
foreign-exchange supply and demand is set up by foreign-exchange market players 
transactions. In the foreign-exchange market, the players can be categorized in two parts i.e.  
fundamentalist and chartist who have foreign-exchange expectations based on their own rule. 
Generally, chartists build their own foreign-exchange expectations using technical analysis 
rules to explore paste movements of exchange rate in the future. Meanwhile, fundamentalists 
build their exchange-rate expectations based on macroeconomic indicators such as inflation, 
interest rate, productivity, etc. Each of expectations are regarded as long-run equilibrium or 
steady state for each foreign-exchange players within their own regimes.  
The fundamentalist and chartist expects that market exchange rate will converge to its 
long-run or steady state rate within a specific period depending on the current deviation 
between market exchange-rate and the respected steady state value. In this research, basic 
model is adopted from Maatoug, Fatnassi, Omri (2010: 30-34) and Reitz (2002: 3-7). The 
exchange rate is built by interactions between foreign exchange market traders which is 
divided into 2 groups i.e fundamentalist and chartists. Fundamentalists forecasting rules and 
Chartists forecasting rules can be expressed, respectively, as follow: This paper applies the 
marcov-switching approach on exchange rate expectation by fundamentalists and chartists in 
Indonesia as suggested by Reitz (2002). This paper will also augment the basic model with 
some contemporaneous variables beside exchange-rate return and exchange-rate intervention 
with other variables such as NDF return and CDS. These such augmented variables are used 
as they may have significant impact on exchange-rate behavior. 
Within this specification as also suggested by Frankel and Froot (1986: 24–38), the 
exchange-rate    is driven by the decisions of foreign-exchange players (chartist and 
fundamentalist) to buy or sell foreign currency based on their expectation of future exchange-
rate changes and augment by a set of contemporaneous variables included in a vector zt. 
Hence, the model specification is written as: 
      [    ]                        (1) 
where the vector of elasticities of the contemporaneous variables ( ) and the elasticity 
of exchange rate expectation ( ) should be constant overtime.  
As proposed by Frankel and Froot (1986: 24–38), the market exchange rate return will 
be generated by the two players’ exchange rate expectations or a mixture of chartist 
  
 [[    ]] and fundamentalist   
 [[    ]] forecasts: 
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The parameter   , denoting the weight given to fundamentalist views at date t. this 
expectation is dynamically updated by the fundamentalist in a rational Bayesian manner: 
           
                        (3) 
With : 
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Where   
  is estimated weight given to group of fundamentalist when expecting future 
exchange rate. Meanwhile, the value of   reflects the extent to which portfolio managers 
enclose new information from central bank intervention using adaptive process. Since 
portfolio managers always maintain a positive weight for both chartist and fundamentalist 
forecasts,   has to be restricted so that   stays in the range between 0 and 1 reflected the 
portion of each group (fundamentalist and chartist) when determining exchange rate. 
Meanwhile, to optimize the weight assigned to fundamentalist, Lewis (1989: 79–100) assume 
fundamentalist forecasts exchange rate by means of a Bayesian learning process as follow: 
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Where           
 [  ]  and   (  |    
 [  ])  is density function of foreign-exchange 
return    of chartist and fundamentalist, respectively. With regard to fundamentalist view, the 
market exchange-rate is assumed to revert to long-run fundamental equilibrium   ̃, within a 
given speed  over time depending on the current gap between current exchange-rate    and 
long-run fundamental exchange rate   ̃, i.e.:  
  
 [    ]      ̃              (6) 
Meanwhile, regarding to chartist view, the market exchange-rate is assumed to revert 
to long-run chartist equilibrium   ̃, within a given speed   over time depending on the current 
gap between current exchange-rate    and long-run chartist exchange rate   ̃, i.e.:  
  
 [    ]      ̃                 (7) 
In this model, the market exchange rate is built by interactions between 
fundamentalist and chartists in foreign-exchange market. Each group of players believe that 
market exchange rate will equate to their own expectation in a specific period of time which 
is denoted by   (a speed of adjustment of the market exchange-rate for fundamental rule) and 
                                                                     . Meanwhile,   ̃ 
is the long-run fundamental (chartist) exchange rate which is built based on economic 
indicator (previous) data behaviour by fundamentalist (chartist). According to fundamentalist, 
foreign-exchange expectation by the exchange-rate traders can be moved as distributed 
symmetrically around its fundamental value   ̃. Although several researchers implement PPP 
as proxy of exchange-rate fundamental value, this paper employs uncovered interest parity 
(UIP) as the long-run fundamental value   ̃. The model above explains that market exchange-
rate will converge to its fundamental value   ̃ in the long run. A study using PPP by Takagi 
(1991) provides evidence there is a valid relationship between market exchange-rate and 
fundamental exchange rate only in the long run implying low values for . This view is also 
supported by Taylor and Peel (2000) and Taylor (2001) showing that due to its nonlinear 
dynamics the exchange rate reverts to the PPP level, but only in the long run. Furthermore, 
PPP or UIP as a measure of the fundamental exchange rate    seems to be suitable for the 
investigation of central bank intervention, because monetary authorities have used it as a 
target level (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993).  
As defined by Maatoug, Fatnassi, Omri (2010) this study specify two states of 
unobserved latent variables (fundamentalist and chartists regimes) to be incorporated in the 
model denoted by variable lt (lt = c for chartist regime lt = f for fundamentalists one). The 
state of regimes is parameterized as a first order Markov process and is driven by first-order 
transition probabilities which expressed as follow: 
                           (8) 
                             (9) 
The transition probabilities between regimes (fundamentalist-chartist) are assumed to 
be constant over time. Fundamentalist transition probabilities (p) is the probability of 
exchange rate expectations will remain in the fundamentalist regime, and chartist exchange-
rate expectation transition probabilities (q) for the chartist stay in the chartist regime which 
are described as follow: 
               
               (10) 
                 
              (11) 
If market exchange rate does not converge to its fundamental value in the long run, 
central banks will enter the foreign exchange market. The efforts of the central banks on 
foreign exchange markets can be called effective, if the adjustment of the current exchange 
rate to its long run fundamental equilibrium is accelerated.  
 
3.2  The Foreign Exchange Intervention/Monetary Policy Augmented Regime-
Switching-C&F Model: RS-CF-Int-NDF-CDS 
Reitz (2002) outlined exchange-rate expectation modeled using Markov_Switching 
approach both in the conditional mean and variance for both fundamentalists and chartists. 
Inspired by the model this paper defines the mean equation of the first regime represent the 
fundamentalist regime including the deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamental 
value et describe by Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) as outlined above. UIP is chosen 
because it reflects the monetary policy instrument to achieve desired domestic price as well 
as to support sustainable economic growth. The mean specification model for fundamentalist 
is defined as follow: 
  
 [    ]                )       (12) 
This paper expands the original model by augmenting Foreign Exchange Intervention 
(I), Non-Delivery Forward (NDF) USD/IDR, and Credit Default Swap (CDS) rate variable to 
see the impact of foreign exchange intervention by the central bank, NDF and CDS to 
foreign exchange rate expectation by the market players (fundamentalists and chartists). In 
introducing foreign exchange intervention/monetary policy operations into the regime-
switching framework, this research defines that the dummy variable It = 1, if the central bank 
intervenes (by foreign exchange intervention/monetary policy) at time t and It = 0,otherwise 
and rewrite the mean equations of the standard C&F model as follow: 
  
 [    ]             –             (13) 
for fundamentalist augmented rule model, where 
 
 
                         where 
         (14) 
This implies that the observed reversion of the exchange rate to PPP or UIP – 
denoted by  t - is driven by fundamentalist speculation, central bank intervention, NDF rate 
and CDS rate. Denoting the influence of foreign exchange intervention/monetary policy by 
, NDF by   and CDS by   , this research can formulate  t as a function of a 0,1- 
Exchange-rate Intervention dummy   , NDFt  and CDSt   
Meanwhile, Reitz (2002) defines the second regime’s mean equation contains 
chartist expectation. Chartists are foreign-exchange player who believe that current exchange 
rate will move to its long-run average value measured by technical trading rules concerning 
previous exchange-rate behavior i.e. the moving average trading consisting of the differences 
between ma3 and ma200. Meaning that chartists are supposed to expect that a future exchange 
rate moves are predicted by the  proportion   of the positive difference between the 3 day 
moving average (ma3) and 200 day moving average (ma200) and vice versa, in this case. 
Hence, chartist exchange rate expectation is defined as: 
  
 [    ]                           (15) 
The variance of  et, i.e. the volatility of et is assumed to be constant within regimes, 
h0t =   
  and h1t =   
  thus the source of conditional heterokedasticity is the regime switching 
behavior. 
Generally, a central bank will conduct foreign-exchange interventions implementing 
a leaning against the wind-strategy to change the traders foreign-exchange expectation back 
to chartist long-run exchange rate average value of       . In this type of study, subsequent 
changes in noise trader’s positions magnify the initial impact of intervention operations, 
augmented by other significant variables such as NDF and CDS. Hence, the model 
specification can be rewriten as follows: 
  
 [    ]                       ,      (16) 
This implies that a given trend in the exchange rate ( t) is due to chartist speculation, 
central bank intervention, augmented by other variables such as NDF and CDS rate. 
Denoting the influence of foreign exchange intervention/monetary policy by , NDF by 
   and CDS by    this research can formulate  t as a 0,1-intervention dummy   , NDFt  
and CDSt as follows: 
 
 
                             where                  
(17) 
Clearly, if the foreign exchange intervention of the central bank had an impact on the 
forecasting performance of chartists and fundamentalists, a change of coefficients represented 
by significant estimates of the various i should be observed. By introducing intervention 
dummies, NDF rate, and CDS rate in the specification of second moment, the conditional 
variance becomes: 
      
                                                                                       
     
                               
       
                                                                                   
(19) 
for the chartist regime. Thus, this paper is able to re-examine the relationship between 
central bank intervention, NDF, CDS and exchange rate volatility. 
 
 
4. RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
4.1  Data 
The data are daily for the sample period 2006 – 2012. All variables are in logarithms 
except for the interest rate variables, which are in annual terms. The foreign variable is US 
Federal Funds Rate. The Indonesian variables are domestic o/n interbank interest rate, the 
underlying consumer price index, NDF USD/IDR Rate, CDS rate, the USD/IDR spot 
exchange rate, and foreign-exchange intervention by BI. The microstructure of foreign 
exchange in Indonesia is still limited as few traders exist in foreign exchange market. Even 
though there are 72 foreign exchange banks in Indonesia, only about 22 to 38 banks actively 
trade in the foreign exchange market. However, Bank Indonesia state that the microstructure 
of the domestic foreign exchange market also influences the effectiveness of intervention. 
The net supplier of foreign exchange is still dominated by domestic state-owned banks, while 
foreign banks’ supply or demand depends on capital inflow/outflow. The volume of 
transactions tends to be larger during periods of heavy portfolio inflows. Most foreign-
exchange transactions are spot accompanied by swap, although forward transactions are 
developing. There are counter-party transaction limits, especially for smaller banks. Foreign-
exchange transactions must have underlying and are limited to domestic players only 
(Warjiyo, 2013). 
 
4.2  Evidence of Exchange Rate Expectation & Central bank’s Intervention in 
Indonesia 
The models described above were estimated by maximum likelihood. Parameter 
estimates were obtained using the BFGS algorithm, and the reported t-statistics are based on 
heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors (White,1982). The estimates are derived from the 
daily USD/IDR spot exchange rate series kindly supplied by Bloomberg. The UIP was 
constructed using daily O/N Interbank rate of IDR and USD. The intervention dummy 
series is based on intervention data kindly provided from the Bank Indonesia. The foreign 
exchange intervention series only includes active foreign-exchange interventions made by 
Bank Indonesia to influence foreign exchange rates. Foreign-exchange intervention by BI is 
reported whenever they changed their net foreign assets. The sample extends from January 
2006 to June 2012. The series of the spot exchange rate, the UIP relation and the 200 day 
moving average are presented in upper graph, Bank Indonesia purchases and sales of Dollars 
against IDR can be seen as vertical graph in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. USD/IDR spot rate,UIP, MA 200 and BI FX intervention 
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(4,51)*** 
   2   
2,90   10 5 
(1,66)* 
2,99   10 5 
 2,09 ** 
2,97   10 5 
(1,74)* 
  
2 
2,31   10 6 
(11,51)*** 
1,97   10 6 
(6,77)*** 
1,60   10 6 
(6,33)*** 
1,39   10 6 
(4,74)*** 
   2   
6,21   10 7 
(1,17) 
8,00   10 7 
(2,00)** 
7,83  10 7 
(0,88) 
  
0.901 
(19,96)*** 
0.890 
(18,67)*** 
0,814 
(12,87)*** 
0,784 
(11,18)*** 
  
0,936 
(50,42)*** 
0,926 
(32,19)*** 
0,894 
(23,71)*** 
0,853 
(18,17)*** 
  0,380 0,400 0,365 0,360 
  0,620 0,600 0,635 0,640 
 1     1 8,90 9,06 5,39 3,82 
 1     1 14,52 13,57 9,39 6,80 
Log-
Likelihood 
6279,31 6313,95 6362,74 6379,40 
LRT  69,28* * *  166,86* * *  200,17* * *  
 
Table 1. Estimation Result 
 
Note: The sample contains daily observations of the USD/IDR spot exchange rate 
from January 2006 to June 2012. See text for meaning of symbols. t-statistics in parentheses 
are based on heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. The likelihood ratio test statistic is 
asymptotically 2 (df)-distributed with df indicating the numbers of restrictions. *, ** and 
*** denotes significance at the 90%,95% and 99% level, respectively. 
 
Table 1 contains the estimates of the RS-CF,  the RS-CF-INT, RS-CF-INT-NDF and 
RS-CF-INT-NDF-CDS models. As regards the smoothed transition probabilities, the all 
models differ slightly at best. p and q range above 0.78 thereby indicating high persistence of 
regimes. The unconditional probability of the fundamentalist regimes    
   
     
 is lower 
than the one assigned to chartist regimes for all respected models. This is also reflected in the 
expected duration of fundamentalist regime. In the RS-CF model (a), the (first) 
fundamentalist regimes         is expected to last up to 8.9 trading days where as the 
(second) chartist regimes         have a longer duration of at least 14.5 trading days. 
Meanwhile, the fundamentalist rule USD/IDR expectation share   is about 38% smaller than 
the chartist rule USD/IDR expectation   (62%) in performing USD/IDR market rate. 
Significant estimates of variances point to regime dependent heteroscedasticity capturing 
periods of high and low volatility: the variance in the second regimes   
  in these conditional 
regimes is lower than the variance in the first regimes   
 . The estimates of chartist and 
fundamentalist coefficients   and , are statistically significant and of the correct sign 
despite showing very low values meaning the market exchange rate will converge to their 
own steady-state value in the long run. These findings are supported by other study by 
Takagi (1991). He provides evidence there is a valid relationship between market exchange-
rate and fundamental exchange rate only in the long run implying low values for . 
 
Figure 2. Smoothed Probabilities “basic model” 
 
In the RS-CF-INT model (b), the (first) fundamentalist regimes are expected to last 
up         to 9 trading days where as the (second) chartist regimes         have a 
longer duration of at least 13.5 trading days. Even it is better that model (a) because of BI 
exchange rate intervention, the fundamentalist rule USD/IDR expectation share   is about 
40% still smaller than the chartist rule USD/IDR expectation   (60%) in performing 
USD/IDR market rate. Significant estimates of variances point to regime dependent 
heteroscedasticity capturing periods of high and low volatility: the variance in the second 
regimes   
  in these conditional regimes is still lower than the variance in the first regimes 
  
  even though for chartist it gets smaller variance. The estimates of chartist and 
fundamentalist coefficients   and , are also statistically significant and of the correct sign. 
 Figure 3. Smoothed Probabilities “basic model augmented with FX Intervention” 
 
In the RS-CF-INT-NDF model (c), the (first) fundamentalist regimes are expected to 
last up         to 5.4 trading days where as the (second) chartist regimes         have 
a longer duration of at least 9.4 trading days. Because of BI exchange rate intervention and 
NDF rate variable, the fundamentalist rule USD/IDR expectation share   decreases to about 
37% which is even smaller than the chartist rule USD/IDR expectation    (63%) in 
performing USD/IDR market rate. Significant estimates of variances point to regime 
dependent heteroscedasticity capturing periods of high and low volatility: the variance in the 
second regimes   
  in these conditional regimes is still lower than the variance in the first 
regimes   
  even though for chartist it gets smaller variance. The estimates of chartist and 
fundamentalist coefficients   and , are also statistically significant and of the correct sign. 
 
Figure 4. Smoothed Probabilities “basic model augmented with FX Intervention & 
NDF” 
 
In the RS-CF-INT-NDF-CDS model (d), the regime switching is getting faster than 
those in previous models meaning of increasing exchange rate uncertainty, the (first) 
fundamentalist regimes are expected to last up         to 3.8 trading days where as the 
(second) chartist regimes         have a longer duration of at least 6.8 trading days. 
Because of BI exchange rate intervention, augmented with NDF rate, and CDS 1mth variable, 
the fundamentalist rule USD/IDR expectation share   decreases to about 36% which is even 
smaller than the chartist rule USD/IDR expectation    (64%) in performing USD/IDR market 
rate. Significant estimates of variances point to regime dependent heteroscedasticity capturing 
periods of high and low volatility: the variance in the second regimes   
  in these conditional 
regimes is still lower than the variance in the first regimes   
  even though for chartist it gets 
smaller variance. The estimates of chartist and fundamentalist coefficients   and , are also 
statistically significant and of the correct sign. 
 
 
Figure 5. Smoothed Probabilities model augmented with FX Intervention & NDF & 
CDS” 
 
Figure Smoothed Probabilities of USD/IDR in the basic model (a) no intervention, no 
NDF &CDS, (b) augmented with BI intervention, (c) augmented with BI intervention & 
NDF, (d) augmented with BI intervention, NDF, and CDS. 
However, the most important results from these Markov switching procedures are 
significant parameter estimates of chartist and fundamentalist forecasting techniques within 
the heterogeneous expectations framework. As has been outlined in the theoretical section of 
the paper, central bank interventions are supposed to affect exchange rates by influencing 
chartist and fundamentalist forecasting success. Because the standard RS-CF model is nested 
in the more general RS-CF-INT-NDF-CDS model, the hypothesis can be examined by the 
values of the log-likelihood functions, the likelihood ratio test (LRT) statistic and the 
estimates of the various s,  s, s, in table 1. 
As the LRT statistic suggests, the consideration of intervention dummies, NDF, and 
CDS, explain a significant improvement in the log-likelihood function. Hence, the 
hypothesis that exchange rate expectations are not affected by central bank interventions, 
NDF, and CDS has to be rejected. Particularly, the results of parameter estimates give rise to 
the conclusion that foreign exchange activities of Bank Indonesia, NDF and CDS, could 
have supported fundamentalist and chartists rules. The dummy exchange-rate intervention 
coefficient  of the central bank is significant and reports a significant increase of    
whenever It  = 1. In the case of addition of new variable ‘NDF’ and ‘CDS’, respectively the 
coefficient    of the central bank is still significant, while     is insignificant. However, 
totally the effect, reports a significance increase of  
 
, meaning that speed of adjustment to 
long-run/fundamental value is increasing when fundamentalists dominated the market and 
central banks intervene. 
When looking at the link between central bank intervention, within chartist exchange 
rate expectations model, the (b) model recognizes insignificant decreasing change of  
 
 as 
                value though insignificant. This implies that the adjustment of the 
exchange rate to its long run equilibrium has been decelerated in periods when chartists 
dominated the market and central banks intervene. In the case of addition of new variable 
‘NDF’ and ‘CDS’ to the chartist model as shown in (d) model, the coefficient    and   are 
surprisingly significant and reports a significance increase of  
 
, meaning that speed of 
adjustment to its long-run value is increasing because of NDF and CDS (even though   - 
                          decrease the speed of adjustment to its long run equilibrium in 
one hand when chartists dominated the foreign-exchange market). 
Regarding to volatility in relation with central bank’s FX Intervention, this research 
finds that this is confirmed by the finding that the FX intervention dummy (especially in 
fundamentalist regime) in the model RS_CF_INT, identified periods in which the volatility is 
a bit increase except in chartist regime which is not significant, as shown in Table 6. It has 
also same conclusion when using model (d), while model (c) reports contradiction. However, 
the result should be very careful before quickly concluding that exchange rate volatility 
increase in fundamental regime is due to intervention operations. Rising uncertainty of global 
financial condition which may ignite sudden and massive capital flows, disorderly markets’, 
speculative transactions behaviour, may hamper central bank intervention policy. This is 
confirmed in a study by Baillie and Osterberg (1997a) that find evidence that foreign-
exchange interventions by US, German, and Japanese central banks have tended to increase 
foreign-exchange volatility in the USD/JPY forward market when JPY/USD is under 
pressure. This is also supported by findings in a study by Giner and Mendoza (2005) which 
argues that foreign-exchange intervention appears to be effective in short time or the 
effectiveness will be short-lived. He also finds that the more frequently exchange-rate 
intervention applied by the central bank, the effectiveness would be smaller. In the case of 
Indonesia, the central bank enters the foreign exchange market almost every day, this might 
confirm why the volatility is conversely increased. Furthermore, excessive exchange-rate 
fluctuations might be found as another factor that halts Bank Indonesia effort to reach the 
effectiveness of foreign exchange market in driving exchange rate to its long-run fundamental 
or in achieving price stability condition. This phenomenon, making central bank intervention 
remains an ambiguous policy tool in influencing exchange rates. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this research, the effect of central bank intervention within a heterogeneous 
expectation exchange-rate model, is investigated. The results are supporting both chartists 
and fundamentalist regimes. It is shown that the two regimes are persistent. The estimates of 
chartist and fundamentalist coefficients   and , are statistically significant and of the correct 
sign despite showing very low values meaning the market exchange rate will converge to 
their own steady-state value in the long run. In the period investigated, chartist dominates in 
the exchange rate determination. As the LRT statistic suggest, the consideration of foreign-
exchange intervention dummies explain a significant improvement in the log-likelihood 
function. Hence, the hypothesis that exchange rate expectations are not affected by central 
bank interventions has been rejected. Particularly, the result of parameter estimates give rise 
to  the conclusion that foreign exchange activities of BI could have supported fundamentalist 
(UIP) & chartist (Moving Average) trading rules but in opposite direction. The dummy BI 
FX Interventions coefficient in the fundamentalist period  is positive whereas in the chartist 
period   is negative; but only the coefficient of fundamentalist is highly significant in the 
complete model (d). 
When looking at the link between BI FX Intervention within both 
fundamentalist/chartist exchange rate expectations, this study recognizes very significant 
change of  t and    but in opposite direction. This implies that the adjustment of the exchange 
rate to its long run (fundamental) equilibrium ‘UIP’ has been accelerated in the periods when 
fundamentalists dominated the market and central bank intervenes as it improve the 
performance of expectations based on fundamentals, especially when central banks try to 
correct current exchange rate misalignments. On the other hand, the adjustment of the 
exchange rate to its long run (fundamental/chartists equilibrium) has been decelerated in the 
periods when chartists dominated the market and central bank intervenes. 
In the case of Indonesia, it is shown that the predictive power of fundamentalist 
forecasting techniques approximated by the deviation of the current exchange rate from the 
UIP level, were enhanced whenever the Bank Indonesia intervened on the foreign exchange 
market. There is evidence that within this framework, central bank operations on foreign 
exchange market has been called effective, as the adjustment of the exchange rate to its long 
run (fundamental) equilibrium is accelerated when fundamentalists dominated the market 
and central bank intervenes, not when chartists dominated the market. It means that the 
impact of central bank intervention on foreign exchange rates is only effective when 
assessed by means fundamentalist regime approaches. In this regards, Bank Indonesia’s 
foreign-exchange intervention has been able to drive the USD/IDR to long-run/fundamental 
‘UIP’ as assumed in fundamentalist rule. 
With regard to exchange-rate volatility, however, Bank Indonesia efforts to exert a 
stabilizing effect of foreign exchange interventions, the result still does not show what Bank 
Indonesia wants as the variance shows increasing value. Several factors such as external 
shocks and disorderly foreign exchange market which beyond Bank Indonesia control, may 
play significant role behind this findings. 
 
6. Policy Implication 
In this research, the effect of central bank intervention within a heterogeneous 
expectation exchange rate model is investigated. The results are supporting both chartists and 
fundamentalist regimes. In the period investigated, chartist dominates in the exchange rate 
determination. While BI foreign exchange intervention can push the market rate to its long-
run fundamental equilibrium, however, Bank Indonesia’s effort to exert a stabilizing effect of 
foreign exchange interventions, the result does not show a success. 
As a policy implication, the central bank should pay attention more to the foreign-
exchange market player, especially the fundamentalist and chartist as they have a significant 
role in determining market exchange rate. The central bank should drive exchange rate 
expectation to the fundamentalist’s rule as it is relevant with monetary objective in achieving 
targeted inflation. Furthermore, foreign-exchange intervention is proven effective when 
exchange-rate expectation is dominated by fundamentalist. As consequence, the central bank 
should implement optimal monetary policy with appropriate strategy especially in 
determining optimal interest rate and exchange-rate intervention as well as implement 
governance aspects of monetary policy. 
For a small open economy like Indonesia, exchange rate movement does not always 
reflect fundamental value. Increasing USD/IDR exchange rate volatility often occurs as a 
result of rising uncertainty of global economic condition which ignites sudden massive 
capital flows, irrational behavior of market players, the microstructure conditions of the 
market, and offshore market influence. 
As a policy implication, relying solely on Bank Indonesia’s interest rate policy to 
achieve the inflation target and maintain stability is not always sufficient. The central bank’s 
strategy is to include exchange rate policy in the monetary and macro-prudential policy in 
order to achieve its goal more effectively. 
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